A privacy-preserving solution for the bipartite ranking problem by Faramarzi N.S. et al.
A Privacy-Preserving Solution for the Bipartite
Ranking Problem
Noushin Salek Faramarzi, Erman Ayday, H. Altay Güvenir
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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an efficient solution for the
privacy-preserving of a bipartite ranking algorithm. The bipartite
ranking problem can be considered as finding a function that
ranks positive instances (in a dataset) higher than the negative
ones. However, one common concern for all the existing schemes
is the privacy of individuals in the dataset. That is, one (e.g., a
researcher) needs to access the records of all individuals in the
dataset in order to run the algorithm. This privacy concern puts
limitations on the use of sensitive personal data for such analysis.
The RIMARC (Ranking Instances by Maximizing Area under the
ROC Curve) algorithm solves the bipartite ranking problem by
learning a model to rank instances. As part of the model, it learns
weights for each feature by analyzing the area under receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. RIMARC algorithm is
shown to be more accurate and efficient than its counterparts.
Thus, we use this algorithm as a building-block and provide
a privacy-preserving version of the RIMARC algorithm using
homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation.
Our proposed algorithm lets a data owner outsource the storage
and processing of its encrypted dataset to a semi-trusted cloud.
Then, a researcher can get the results of his/her queries (to learn
the ranking function) on the dataset by interacting with the cloud.
During this process, neither the researcher nor the cloud learns
any information about the raw dataset. We prove the security of
the proposed algorithm and show its efficiency via experiments
on real data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of privacy-preserving algorithms in data mining is
to lower the risk of misuse of individuals’ sensitive data and
at the same time produce high quality results (i.e., similar to
the ones that would be produced in the absence of privacy
preserving techniques [1]. In this work, we focus on the
bipartite ranking problem and we propose an algorithm that
efficiently solves the problem in a privacy-preserving way.
Bipartite ranking problem is about learning a ranking func-
tion from a training set of positively and negatively labelled
examples. Once the resulting ranking function is applied to a
new (unlabelled) instance, the function is expected to establish
a total order in which positive instances precede negative
ones [2]. The most commonly used criterion for measuring
the quality of the resulting bipartite ranking function is the
area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
(referred as AUC).
One common drawback of the algorithms that solve the
bipartite ranking problem is their applicability in real-life
settings. This drawback arises due to privacy-sensitivity of
personal data that is collected by the data owner. In most
cases, the data owner (that collects and labels the data) does
not have sufficient resources (i.e., storage and computation
power) to answer the queries (to learn a ranking function on
the dataset) of the researchers about the dataset. For instance,
most researchers request sensitive medical information from
hospitals to work on, but privacy concerns make the hospitals
unwilling to provide such information.
On the one hand, getting the result of such queries (and
learning the ranking function) is very valuable for the re-
searchers in most cases. On the other hand, the data owner
does not directly share its own dataset with the researcher due
to the aforementioned privacy and legal concerns. Therefore,
usually, the data owner has two options: (i) the data owner may
anonymize the dataset before sharing it with the researchers,
which reduces the utility (or accuracy) of the dataset, and
hence the query result, or (ii) it can outsource the storage and
processing of the dataset to a trusted party, however existence
of such a trusted party is not practical in most real-life settings.
In this work, we focus on the latter option, but rather than
assuming the existence of a fully trusted party, we resort to
using cryptographic techniques.
As discussed, there are many algorithms in the literature
that solves the bipartite ranking problem [2], [3]. A recent
algorithm, named RIMARC (Ranking Instances by Maxi-
mizing Area under the ROC Curve) achieves high AUC
values compared to other works, while providing a low time
complexity [4]. In this work, we use the RIMARC algorithm
as a building-block and propose a privacy-preserving version
of the RIMARC algorithm. To achieve our goal, we use
homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation.
The proposed algorithm ensures that no party other than
the data owner can access to the content of the database.
Furthermore, the researchers can only obtain the results of
their queries, and the cloud does not learn anything about the
dataset. We prove the security of the proposed algorithm and
show its efficiency via experiments on real data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we provide background information about the
RIMARC algorithm and the cryptographic tools we use in our
algorithm. In Section III, we describe our proposed privacy-
preserving algorithm in detail and we also provide a brief
security analysis. In Section IV, we provide the experimental
results. Finally, in Section V, we conclude the paper and
discuss potential future works.
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Here, we provide brief backgrounds on the technical con-
cepts and algorithms we use in this paper.
A. Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is a well-
known tool for evaluating the performance of binary classi-
fiers. It is a powerful metric compared to traditional accuracy
metrics. The ROC curve is generated by plotting the ratio of
the true positive rate (TPR) to the false positive rate (FPR) at
different threshold values. Each (FPR, TPR) pair corresponds
to a specific point on the ROC curve. A perfect classifier yields
a point on the upper left corner (or coordinate (0, 1)) of the
ROC space. On the other hand, a completely random guess
would give a point along a diagonal line from the left bottom
to the top right corners towards (0.5, 0.5).
B. Area Under the ROC Curve
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a measure of
the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen
positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative in-
stance. The highest possible AUC value is 1.0 which represents
a perfect classification, and a value of 0.5 corresponds to
a random decision [5]. Therefore, the values below 0.5 can
be easily neglected. A feature with a higher AUC value can
determine the class label with a higher relevance. AUC is an
indicator for quality of ranking and the higher AUC implies
better ranking.
C. RIMARC Algorithm
Ranking Instances by Maximizing Area under the ROC
Curve (RIMARC) algorithm learns a model that ranks in-
stances based on how they are likely to have a positive label; an
attempt for maximizing the AUC [4]. Each ranking function
is learned for each feature in order to maximize the AUC.
The AUC value, obtained for a single feature shows the effect
of that feature in ranking. An important property of such a
ranking function is that it is in a human readable form that
can be easily assessed by domain experts.
In order to construct the ranking function for a given feature
fi, all continuous features are first discretized into categorical
ones in a way that optimizes the AUC. This discretization can
be done by a method called “MAD2C” [6]. The score value
(S) for a given category j of a specific feature fi, including
discretized continuous features, can be computed as below:
S(cji ) =
P (cji )




Here, cji represents the j
th category of feature fi. Also, P (c
j
i )
and N(cji ) represent the total number of positive and negative
instances of cji , respectively.
All the categories (of a given feature) are sorted according
to their score values computed in the previous step. Since
the ranking function used by RIMARC always results in a
convex ROC curve, the AUC is always greater than or equal
to 0.5. The ROC curve points, (FPR, TPR), corresponding to
each score value is calculated at this step. Using these points,
the AUC value is determined. The weight of a feature, fi is
computed as, wi = 2(AUC(i) − 0.5), where AUC(i) is the


















R 1 0 0 0 0 
G 0 1 0 0 0 
Y 0 0 1 0 0 
B 0 0 0 1 0 
W 0 0 0 0 1 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 1. Toy example of the RIMARC algorithm. (a) training dataset including
a single feature (color) with 5 categories. Labels “N” and “P” represent
the negative and positive labels, respectively. (b) bit representations of the
categories (this representation will be discussed in Section III).
A toy example. To understand how RIMARC works, con-
sider a toy training dataset with a single feature as shown
in Fig. 1(a). The feature we consider in this example has
a total of 5 categories (R,B,W, Y,G). The score values
of these categories are obtained, using Eq. 1, as follows:
S(R) = S(B) = S(W ) = 0, S(Y ) = 0.33, S(G) = 1.0.
As shown in Fig. 2, the score values are sorted and mapped
on an axis. Then, TPR and FPR values calculated for each
score value. AUC value is determined using the area under
the ROC curve.
D. Homomorphic Encryption
In this work, we use the Paillier cryptosystem [7] that
provides additive homomorphism. Let p and q be two large
prime numbers, n = p · q be the security parameter, g be
a random integer (such that g ∈ Z∗n2 ), and λ be the least
common multiple of (p − 1) and (q − 1). Let also the mod-
ular multiplicative inverse μ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1, where
L(u) = (u− 1)/n. Then, the public key pk is represented by
the pair (n, g) and the private key sk is represented by the
pair (λ, μ).
Encryption of a message m (m ∈ Zn) is done by selecting
a random number r (r ∈ Z∗n) and computing the ciphertext
E(m) = gm · rn mod n2. Decryption of an encrypted
message c (c ∈ Z∗n2 ) is done by computing D(c, sk) = L(cλ
mod n2) · μ mod n.
The Paillier cryptosystem is an additively homomorphic
cryptosystem and, as such, it supports some computations in
the ciphertext domain. In particular, let m1 and m2 be two
messages encrypted with the same public key pk. Then, the
encryption of the sum of m1 and m2 can be computed as
E(m1 +m2) = E(m1) ·E(m2). Furthermore, any ciphertext
E(m) raised to a constant number c is equal to the encryption
of the product of the corresponding plaintext and the constant
as E(m · c) = E(m)c.
376


























Fig. 2. Calculation of the TPR and FPR values for the toy example (in Fig. 1(a)). Score values of the categories are determined using Eq. 1. Thus,
S(R) = S(B) = S(W ) = 0, S(Y ) = 0.33, and S(G) = 1.0. TPR and FPR values are computed for each score value as shown in the figure. Then, the
AUC value is computed in the graph based on the computed (FPR,TPR) points as (P1,P2,P3,P4).
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, our solution for privacy preserving RIMARC
algorithm is explained in detail.
A. System and Threat Models
We have three main parties in the system: (i) data owner,
which collects and provides the dataset that consists of sen-
sitive data, (ii) cloud, which is responsible for the storage
and processing of the dataset, and (iii) researcher, which
is interested in analyzing the dataset and obtaining ranking
functions out of it.
Dataset is stored at the cloud in encrypted form (details
are provided in the next subsections). Our goal is to make
sure that no party other than the data owner can access the
plaintext (non-encrypted) format of the whole dataset. We
also want to make sure that (i) the cloud does not learn
any information about the dataset (including the result that
is provided to the researcher), and (ii) the researcher only
learns the results of his (authorized) query, and nothing else. In
order to achieve these goals, we propose a privacy-preserving
algorithm between the cloud and the researcher in order to
compute that AUC values. Our proposed protocol involves
cryptographic primitives such as homomorphic encryption and
secure two-party computation.
We assume the data owner to have public/private key
pair (pko, sko) for the Paillier cryptosystem (as discussed in
Section II-D). Public key of the data owner is known by all
parties in the system and the secret key is only shared with
the researcher (so that the researcher can decrypt and obtain
the results of his queries). Note that, rather than providing the
private key of of the data owner to the researcher, it is also
possible to use a threshold cryptography scheme, in which
the private key is divided into two parts and these parts are
distributed to the researcher and the cloud [8]. This threshold
cryptography feature can be easily integrated into the proposed
algorithm depending on the use case scenario. Our proposed








algorithm to compute 
the ranking function
Fig. 3. Proposed system model.
We assume all parties in the system to be honest-but-
curious. That means both the cloud and the researcher can try
to learn the sensitive data of the data owner (i.e., the content of
the database), but they honestly follow the protocol steps. We
also assume that the researcher and the cloud does not collude
during the protocol. Of course, not every researcher can send
queries to the dataset; the researcher should be authorized in
order to do so. This can be managed via an access control
mechanism, which is out of the scope of this work. Finally, we
assume all communications between the parties to be secured
via end-to-end encryption.
B. Dataset Format and Encryption
Initially, the data owner collects data from record owners
and constructs the dataset. For instance, this can be considered
as a hospital collecting data from patients. We assume that
the dataset consists of the records of N individuals (e.g., N
patients)1. Set of features in the dataset is illustrated as F =
{f1, f2, . . . , fn} (we assume there are n features). Also, set
of categories for a given feature fi is represented as Ci =
1We also assume that continuous features are first discretized into categor-
ical ones.
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{c1i , c2i , . . . , cki }. Here, we assume there are k categories per
feature for simplicity, but each feature may also have different
number of categories as well. Each category also has a label
ji , where 
j
i ∈ {0, 1}2, i ∈ F, and j ∈ Ci.
We represent a category cji as below:
cji = b
j,1
i ||bj,2i || . . . ||bj,ji || . . . ||bj,ki ,
where bj,mi = 0 when m = j and bj,mi = 1 when m = j.
For example, the categories of color feature in our toy ex-
ample (discussed in Section II-C) and their corresponding bit
representations are illustrated in Fig. 1(b). In this example,
we have 5 categories (i.e., colors) for the color feature, and
hence we use 5 bits in the representation, each assigned for
a particular color. We use Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt
the whole dataset. In a nutshell, the data owner encrypts
all categories and corresponding labels using its public key
(pko). To encrypt a category c
j
i , the owner encrypts all its
bits individually. Thus, we represent the encryption of cji as
[bj,1i ]||[bj,2i ]|| . . . ||[bj,,ki ].3 The owner also encrypts all labels ji
to obtain the corresponding [ji ] values. After encryption, the
data owner sends the encrypted data to the cloud for storage.
C. Privacy-Preserving RIMARC Algorithm
In the following, for the simplicity of the presentation, we
describe the proposed algorithm for a single feature fi with k
categories. Note that the algorithm can be easily generalized
to handle multiple features (as we also show in our evaluations
in Section IV). The main steps of the proposed solution are
also illustrated in Fig. 4.
Initially, the cloud counts the number of instances of each
category in the dataset. To compute the sum of instances for







This summation can be easily carried out by using the homo-
morphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem (as discussed
in Section II-D).
Then, the cloud counts the number of positive labelled
instances for each category. To do so, for each category cji ,







computation, however cannot be carried out by using the
homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem (as the
homomorphic properties does not support multiplication of
two encrypted messages). Therefore, we propose using the “se-
cure multiplication algorithm” (in Algorithm 1) between the
cloud and the researcher in order to handle this multiplication
in a privacy-preserving way.
We note that step 7 of Algorithm 1 is to remove the noise
from the product and it can be easily done at the cloud using
the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem. We
discuss the security of the secure multiplication algorithm in
Section III-D. Similarly, the cloud also computes the counts
for number of negative labelled instances for each category.
2ji = 0 represents a negative instance and 
j
i = 1 represents a positive
instance.
3In the rest of the paper, we use angled brackets to represent the encryption
of a message via Paillier encryption under the public key of the data owner.
Algorithm 1 Secure Multiplication Algorithm
Input: @Cloud: encrypted messages [a] and [b]. @Researcher:
(pko, sko).
Output: @Cloud: [a× b]. @Reseacher: ⊥.
1: The cloud generates two random numbers r1 and r2 from the set
{1,. . . ,K}.
2: The cloud masks [a] and [b]:
[â]← [a]× [−r1] = [a− r1],
[b̂]← [b]× [−r2] = [b− r2].
3: The cloud sends [â] and [b̂] to the researcher.
4: The researcher decrypts [â] and [b̂] with sko:
â← D([â], sko),
b̂← D([b̂], sko).
5: The researcher computes â× b̂
6: The researcher encrypts the results with pko to get [â × b̂] and
sends it to the cloud.
7: The cloud computes [a×b]← [â× b̂]+[a]r2 +[b]r1 +[−r1×r2].
To do so, for each category cji , the cloud needs to compute
[N(cji )] = [T (c
j
i )]−[P (cji )]. Note that, this computation can be
easily handled at the cloud using the homomorphic properties
of the Paillier cryptosystem.
Next, the cloud computes the score value for each category.
As discussed, the encrypted score value for a category cji




i )]. Since Paillier
cryptosystem does not support division of two encrypted
numbers, we propose normalizing the score value of each
category. For this normalization, we compute the following





[T (cmi )]. (2)
Since this computation requires multiplication of encrypted
messages, we use the secure multiplication protocol in Algo-
rithm 1 (i.e., we iteratively multiply pairwise values). Then, the
cloud computes the normalized score value for each category
cji as [Ŝ(c
j
i )] = [P (c
j
i )] × [Zji ]. We emphasize that we
only need the order relationship between the score values
of categories to compute the AUC values. Therefore, this
normalization does not decrease the accuracy of the algorithm.
The computed normalized score values ([Ŝ(cji )]) need to
be sorted in order to compute the AUC values. This sort-
ing operation can be securely carried on between the cloud
and the researcher by using a “pairwise secure compari-
son algorithm” [9]. This interactive algorithm compares two
encrypted numbers and returns an encrypted value (to the
cloud) indicating which value is greater. However, in our
scenario, a feature may include tens of categories. Thus,
such a pairwise comparison algorithm requires hundreds of
pairwise comparisons, significantly reducing the efficiency
of the algorithm. Therefore, for this step, we propose a
more lightweight algorithm which only leaks the order of
the normalized score values to the cloud. We describe this
lightweight sorting algorithm in the following.
The cloud initially selects a random number r from the
set {1, . . . ,K} and encrypts it via pko to get [r]. Then, for
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1. Ask cloud to compute the ranking function for a 
given feature that has k categories
2. Compute the total number of instances of each 
category using the homomorphic properties of the 
Paillier cryptosystem
5. Compute the score value for each category using 
the secure multiplication algorithm (Algorithm 1)
4. Compute the total number of negative labelled 
instances using the homomorphic properties of the 
Paillier cryptosystem
3. Compute the total number of positive labelled 
instances using the secure multiplication 
algorithm (Algorithm 1)
6. Sort the computed score values using the secure 
sorting algorithm
7. Compute the k+1 (FPR,TPR) points using the 
homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem 
and send them to the researcher
8. Decrypt the received points and compute the AUC
CLOUD RESEARCHER
Fig. 4. Overview of the proposed solution. Steps 3, 5, and 6 are interactive steps between the cloud and the researcher.
each normalized score value [Ŝ(cji )], the cloud computes the
masked score value [S̃(cji )] = [Ŝ(c
j
i )] + [r]. Let g(.) be a
random shuffling function. The cloud shuffles the order of
the masked score values as g([S̃(c1i )], [S̃(c
2
i )], . . . , [S̃(c
k
i )])
and sends the masked (and encrypted) score values to the
researcher in the shuffled order. The researcher decrypts the
received score values, decrypts them using sko, and sorts them.
Since all normalized score values are masked with the
same random number, their masked order is the same as the
unmasked one. Therefore, the researcher can compute the
correct sorting of these values. After the values are sorted
at the researcher, he/she only sends the sorted order of the
masked score values back to the cloud. Using this information
and the shuffling order of the score values (which is known
by the cloud), the cloud obtains the sorted order of the score
values of all categories. We briefly discuss the security of this
sorting algorithm in Section III-D.
The researcher only needs the k + 1 (FPR, TPR) points
to generate the AUC curve4. Knowing the order of [Ŝ(cji )]
values, the cloud can easily compute the k + 1 encrypted
([FPR],[TPR]) points by using the number of positive and
negative labelled instances for each category (i.e., [P (cji )]
and [N(cji )] values) and by using the homomorphic properties
of the Paillier cryptosystem (computation of the (FPR, TPR)
points are discussed in Section II-C). Finally, the cloud sends
the k + 1 encrypted points to the researcher, the researcher
decrypts the received values by using sko, and constructs the
AUC curve. Note that TPR is the fraction of the true positives
to the total positive labelled instances, and FPR is the fraction
4Since we assume there are k categories, the AUC curve has totally k+1
points.
of the false positives to the total negative labelled instances.
Since, this division cannot be carried out at the cloud, the
cloud sends the numerator and denominator of each point to
the researcher and the division is done at the researcher after
the decryption.
D. Security Evaluation
Throughout the proposed algorithm, the cloud does not learn
anything about the dataset of the data owner, and the researcher
only learns the (FPR, TPR) points to generate the AUC curve.
The proposed algorithm preserves the privacy of data
owner’s data relying on the security strength of the Paillier
cryptosystem. The extensive security evaluation of the Paillier
cryptosystem can be found in [7]. In particular, it is proved
that the cryptosystem provides one-wayness (based on the
composite residuosity class problem) and semantic security5
(based on the decisional composite residuosity assumption).
We also use two interactive algorithms between the cloud
and the researcher: (i) secure multiplication, and (ii) sorting.
We briefly comment on their security in the following. During
the secure multiplication algorithm, the cloud only gets the
encrypted multiplication value, and hence computes [P (cji )].
On the other hand, the researcher (due to the masking with
random numbers r1 and r2) cannot observe any information
about the labels or the categories.
During the sorting algorithm, since the values are masked
and the researcher does not know the random number selected
by the cloud, the researcher cannot learn the actual normalized
score values. Furthermore, since the score values are shuffled
5The adversary cannot distinguish between two different encryptions of the
same message.
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Security Parameter n=512-bits Security Parameter n=1024-bits
16 Features 31 Features 16 Features 31 Features
N=285 
Individuals 9 minutes 17 minutes 56 minutes 106 minutes
N=569 
Individuals 19 minutes 26 minutes 97 minutes 187 minutes
TABLE I
TIME COMPLEXITY OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR DIFFERENT SIZES
OF THE SECURITY PARAMETER (n), DIFFERENT NUMBER OF FEATURES IN
THE DATASET, AND DIFFERENT DATABASE SIZES.
at the cloud, the researcher cannot also learn which category
has the highest score value. The cloud only learns the order
of the normalized score values of the categories. Note that
the data owner may prefer to keep the link between the bit
encoding of a category and the name of the category hidden
from the cloud (as the cloud does not need this information
to do its operations). In such a scenario, learning the order
relationship between the normalized score values does not
mean anything to the cloud. Also, the selected random number
r (from the set {1, . . . ,K}) may be 0 with some probability.
In this case, the researcher may learn the actual values of
the normalized score values. However, this probability is
negligibly small, especially for larger values of K.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we implement and evaluate the proposed
algorithm on a real dataset. We used Wisconsin Diagnostic
Breast Cancer (WDBC) dataset from UCI repository [10].
Dataset contains 569 individuals, each consisting of 31 fea-
tures and labeled as either“M” for malignant (i.e., positive) and
“B” for benign (i.e., negative). Also, each feature has different
number of categories ranging from 8 to 19. As discussed in
section II-C, we used MAD2C algorithm for this step.
To evaluate the practicality of the proposed algorithm,
we implemented it and assessed its storage requirement and
computational complexity on Intel Core i5-2430M CPU with
2.40 GHz processor under Windows 7. Our implementation is
in Java and it relies on the MySQL 5.5 database. We set the
size of the security parameter n for the Paillier cryptosystem
to 512 and 1024 bits in different experiments. In Table I, we
summarize the time complexity of the proposed algorithm.
Based on the results, we can say that the time complexity of
the algorithm increases linearly with the number of individuals
and features. Total time to run the privacy-preserving algo-
rithm is on the order of minutes. Furthermore, the proposed
algorithm is highly parallelizable as computations on each
feature can be carried out independently. We will work on
the parallelization of the algorithm in future work and we
expect an improvement of at least one order of magnitude
in this way. In terms of storage, the original (non-encrypted)
dataset requires 120KB of storage space, while the encrypted
version (thought the proposed algorithm) requires a disk space
of 30MB when n = 512-bits and 60MB when n = 1024-bits.
This increase in the storage requirement is due to the ciphertext
expansion of the Paillier encryption. There exists techniques
to reduce this ciphertext expansion (such as packing [11]),
and we will utilize these techniques to optimize the storage
requirement in future work.
Note that non-private version of the algorithm runs on the
order of seconds and requires less storage space. However, we
believe that this increase in time and storage complexity is a
reasonable compromise in order to obtain a privacy-preserving
algorithm, which is a crucial requirement to process personal
data without privacy and legal concerns. We emphasize that
the accuracy of the results (i.e., obtained ranking function) for
the private algorithm is exactly the same as the non-private
version. To summarize, the performance numbers we obtained
show the practicality of our privacy-preserving algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have developed a privacy-preserving so-
lution for the bipartite ranking problem. We have developed
an efficient and privacy-preserving version of the RIMARC
algorithm. We have used cryptographic tools such as homo-
morphic encryption and secure multi-party computation to
achieve our goals. Then, any researcher can mine the sensitive
data by interacting with the cloud. The proposed algorithm
guarantees that the cloud does not learn any information about
the sensitive data, while the researcher only learns the result of
his query. We have also showed the efficiency of the proposed
algorithm via implementation using a real-life dataset. For
future work, we will optimize the storage requirements of
the proposed algorithm by using the packing technique. We
will also further reduce the time complexity of the proposed
algorithm by parallelizing our implementation for each feature.
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